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Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development:
the

Non-Discrimination Standards

by Marcos Orellana*

T

Introduction

he approach of building mutually supportive trade,
investment, and environmental regimes finds inspiration in the concept of sustainable development. Indeed,
the World Summit on Sustainable Development recognized that
trade and investment are necessary tools for achieving the goals
of sustainable development.1 Economic activities may contribute
to the progressive realization of human rights and environmental protection by fostering economic development, employment,
income generation, and general welfare. This potential contribution is not automatic, however, as non-sustainable investments, or
unwarranted interpretations of trade and investment disciplines,
may defeat such general welfare goals by exposing the population to health risks, causing environmental harm, or reducing the
necessary policy space for sustainable development.
While its exact legal nature and status remain the object of
controversy, at a minimum, sustainable development requires the
integration of environmental issues in decision-making regarding development and investment projects.2 If sustainable development requires the integration of environmental considerations
in the planning and implementation of economic activities, it
follows that the resolution of economic disputes concerning
health, safety, and environmental (“HSE”) measures should also
be integrated into the various fields involved. This process of
integration in dispute settlement places an emphasis on treaty
interpretation and, particularly, an emphasis on the principle of
systemic integration codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.3 In this regard, sustainable development calls
for a process of normative dialogue, and the interpretive principle of systemic integration guides the conversation.
The interpretation and application of substantive investment disciplines carries intense implications for the policy space
available to governments to adopt measures conducive to sustainable development. If compensation by the host government
to the investor is required for the adoption of such measures,
“even where regulatory action is taken in a fair and equitable
manner, the potential cost to the governments may well discourage desirable or necessary environmental regulations.”4 This
general issue is particularly relevant in disputes concerning the
relative non-discrimination standards of most-favored nation
(“MFN”) treatment and national treatment (“NT”) because normal regulatory activity hinges on the construct of categories and
distinctions that underlie differentiated approaches and rules
attaching to particular persons, products, substances, economic
sectors, etc.
3

This paper analyzes key issues concerning the scrutiny of
HSE measures under the non-discrimination standards. It first
introduces the non-discrimination standards and then examines
the thorny questions of discriminatory intent and like circumstances. The paper argues that the construct of relative non-discrimination standards in investment treaties does not incorporate
“necessity” requirements to justify HSE measures, in contrast
to Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Instead,
the relative non-discrimination standards of MFN and NT allow
for HSE considerations in their two core operative elements: “in
like circumstances” and “less favorable treatment.”

The Non-Discrimination Standards
The relative non-discrimination standards proscribe discrimination on the basis of nationality. They require treatment
no less favorable than that afforded to other national or foreign
investors “in like circumstances.”5 The comparison of the treatment afforded to similarly situated investors becomes the master
key to the operation of the non-discrimination standards.
Given that the comparison process involves determining
which investors are similarly situated, taking into account all relevant circumstances, the operation of the standards is far from a
mechanical application of a mathematical formula. Instead, the
application of the non-discrimination standards calls for abstract
legal reasoning and involves a measure of subjective assessment.
Because of this, there is a degree of uncertainty involved in their
operation, which may affect the policy space available to States.
Several questions are relevant to the interpretation of nondiscrimination standards through a sustainable development
lens. For example: what is the meaning of “less favorable treatment,” and is it established by disparate impact alone? Does the
meaning of “in like circumstances” allow authorities to differentiate among investors and/or investments on account of the dissimilar HSE threats posed by different substances, production
processes, geographical conditions, etc? If so, does like circumstances operate as an element of the non-discrimination stan-
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dards, or as an exception, which would transpose the necessity
test of trade law into the investment regime?
This paper addresses the non-discrimination standards of
MFN and NT together, since the focus of analysis is their relation to HSE measures. In trade law, by contrast, national treatment rationales are not necessarily relevant to the interpretation
of MFN disciplines,6 as MFN and “non-discrimination” are
not necessarily synonymous.7 While differences between MFN
and national treatment may be warranted in the trade regime,
in the investment arena, both MFN and NT operate within the
border with respect to largely similar issues. Both the Occidental case and the Cross Border Trucking case (examined below)
have approached their analysis under the assumption that both
the MFN and NT standards are synonymous, in the investment
context.

Discriminatory Purpose
Actual proof of discriminatory intent is generally not
required as an element of discrimination.8 This does not mean
that the purpose of an HSE measure is irrelevant, however.
Account of purpose allows for proper consideration of the perspectives of both the investor and the State, including the public
interest underlying HSE measures, and thus overcomes unidirectional interpretations that consider investment obligations from
the sole vantage point of the investor.9 Moreover, the purpose of
the challenged measure is relevant since less favorable treatment
is not established by disparate impact alone. In practice, national
treatment claims arguing that any treatment that differentially
affects a foreign investor, even if the difference is not attributable to considerations of nationality, have not been successful.10
If these claims were decided otherwise, the State would find
itself unable to regulate in the public interest, with respect to
processes or substances in a market dominated by foreign investors, without risking international liability, given that HSE measures would inevitably affect economic operators differently.
But how can tribunals determine the real purpose behind a
measure? And, how should tribunals address situations of mixed
intent, i.e., situations where a legitimate HSE objective co-exists
with an impermissible motive? The difficulties involved in identifying regulatory purpose are compounded in the modern regulatory State, where legislatures and administrations respond to a
number of often-competing interests, and where so much economic and social activity is highly regulated. In light of the fact
that States are hardly monolithic entities, the determination of
protectionist purpose may become a formidable challenge to a
discrimination claim or defense. The Methanex Tribunal, hearing an arbitration involving groundwater contamination in California, aptly expressed the problem:
In particular, decrees and regulations may be the product of compromises and the balancing of competing
interests by a variety of political actors. As a result, it
may be difficult to identify a single or predominant purpose underlying a particular measure. Where a single
governmental actor is motivated by an improper purpose, it does not necessarily follow that the motive can
Spring 2011

be attributed to the entire government. Much if not all
will depend on the evidential materials adduced in the
particular case.11
Several observations may be warranted in respect to the
difficulties involved in identifying and proving intent. First,
although in international law States may be said to express but
one voice, democracies in practice respond to different, often
competing, political interests. This political feature of democracy is not to be condemned, especially when international law
recognizes that democracy, human rights, and development are
“interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”12 It may well be that
different purposes co-exist and explain why a given measure was
adopted.
In such cases, issues of mixed intent will introduce severe
tensions between economic and HSE considerations. In this
regard, once evidence reveals the existence of HSE risks, the
parallel presence of illicit protectionist intent in some governmental organ should not ipso facto render a measure illegal.
If HSE risks are real, then the HSE protective purpose should
in principle prevail over other purposes, given the paramount
importance of safeguarding health, safety, and the environment.
Second, HSE measures cannot be presumed to be discriminatory. On the contrary, where national authorities have applied
due process and based their findings of risks and determination
of the level of protection on the basis of available scientific evidence, the specificity of HSE measures warrants qualified deference. It is for the claimant to prove discriminatory treatment, and
not incumbent upon the government to demonstrate its public
purpose. That said, the “smell test,” discussed below, the uncertainties as to the location of the threshold involved in making a
prima facie case, and the dangers of negative inferences should
lead cautious governments to be forthcoming in adducing evidence demonstrating the legitimacy of their HSE measures.
With regard to the evidence underlying a HSE measure, the
country of origin of the scientific evidence is not necessarily a
material reason for either accepting or rejecting it.13 The origin
of the scientific evidence cannot sustain a presumption of discriminatory intent because if it could, then most governments
would risk attracting international responsibility for their efforts
in assessing risks. Furthermore, the level of detail or specificity required of the scientific evidence underlying HSE measures
needs to take into account real world considerations and the substantial costs involved in producing a science-based analysis of
the risks presented by the multiple substances, processes, and
activities that interact in society. The burden on developing countries of producing tailored and specific scientific studies, in light
of their limited budget for scientific research and more pressing
priorities such as sanitation and food security, illustrates the tensions surrounding the role of science in investment law.14
Third, in facing the challenges involved in determining protectionist intent, especially when considering facially neutral
measures, tribunals are often tempted to adopt a “smell-test.”15
The degree of circumstantial evidence pointing to protectionist intent may acquire a critical role, especially where direct
evidence is unavailable. Thus, claimants will be drawn to
4

statements from different interests groups active in the political
arena, figures on the expected benefits accruing to competitors
in the marketplace, statements and memos from public officials,
and any other piece of evidence that may serve to raise doubts
as to the legitimacy of purpose. In S.D. Myers, which involved
a ban on the export of hazardous PCB waste from Canada to
the United States, the “smoking gun” tactic proved effective in
convincing the tribunal that at stake was not a legitimate HSE
measure, but rather a sham cover for protectionist purposes.16 In
the Methanex case, the claimant even hired a private investigator
to inspect the garbage of ethanol lobbying firms and to trespass
into their offices.17
Fourth, resort to consistency and necessity could also provide indirect evidence of governmental intent. Such indirect
evidence, however, only offers limited assistance because of the
specific nature of HSE measures as well as the absence of actual
obligations for consistency or necessity. Most often governments
regulate in response to public perception of threats as they arise,
and as scientific progress reveals what were until then “invisible”
risks. Also, sustainable development calls for adaptive management and evolving norms in order to incorporate new scientific
insights and lessons learned regarding the operation and effectiveness of legal tools. Thus, requiring overall consistency in
levels of protection and attaching liability for failure to achieve
consistency would have the law operate in fictitious conditions.
The parallel between Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)
and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(“SPS”)18 of the WTO illustrates the different roles of harmonization and consistency requirements in the trade and investment regimes. The protection of health in a society via sanitary
measures that impede market access for goods that pose SPS
risks will normally impose costs on other countries; to address
this situation and secure market access to foreign goods, the SPS
Agreement pursues harmonization of standards and even presumes conformity when international standards are utilized. 19
Investors and their investments, by contrast, are fully immersed
in the diversity of national and local regulatory requirements,
and it would have been quite far-reaching indeed if international
investment agreements (“IIAs”) pursued harmonization of HSE
standards across legal cultures and across differing levels of
development.
With respect to necessity requirements, could less-trade
restrictive alternatives provide indirect evidence of protectionist intent? In addressing this question, it must first be noted that
the prerogative of countries to establish their levels of protection
stems from their sovereignty, expressed in constitutional mandates to safeguard fundamental rights and to protect the population, inter alia, from HSE risks and that these duties cannot be
surrendered or abandoned.20 Second, countries are not obligated
to justify their measures on the basis of necessity, absent explicit,
conventional commitments to that effect. Third, any inquiry on
less-trade restrictive alternatives should consider that reasonably
available measures should achieve the same level of protection,
involve the same regulatory costs, and restrict trade significantly
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less. Fourth, the textual differences between the SPS Agreement, which explicitly refers to necessity,21 on the one hand, and
non-discrimination disciplines in investment agreements, which
do not usually include such requirement, on the other, must be
given effect.
Fifth and perhaps decisively, in WTO law the remedy for a
measure that offends the less-trade restrictive standard is cessation, i.e., removal of the offending measure and adoption of
the reasonably available less-trade restrictive measure.22 By contrast, investment treaties contemplate monetary damages as the
remedy of choice, which highlights the need to avoid automatic
transposition of trade law into the investment field. Thus, lesstrade restrictive criteria as indirect evidence is of limited value
and could not by itself render sufficient light on illicit motive.
Therefore, arbitral tribunals inclined to employ less-trade
restrictive criteria as indirect evidence should be careful not
to transform them into a substantive necessity requirement. In
claims involving trade and investment issues, the importation of
a necessity test could involve investment arbitration adjudicating trade law claims, in excess of jurisdiction. Further, importing
a necessity test into the non-discrimination standards in investment law would intrude much further into the regulatory autonomy of host States and potentially “lead to odd results.”23
Finally, with respect to “less favorable treatment,” the purpose of a science-based HSE measure should prevail over NT
or MFN claims, including de facto discrimination. A claimant
alleging disguised protectionism in HSE measures will need
to submit compelling evidence proving that the science is a
sham, that no HSE risk exists, or that the government is operating solely for protectionist purposes. Admittedly, this is a high
threshold. Still, the alternative could allow successful challenges
to legitimate HSE measures, thereby compromising the abilities
of governments to fulfill their environmental and human rights
obligations.

Like Circumstances and Non-Discrimination
As the UN International Law Commission observed, even
absent explicit reference to “like circumstances” or “like situations,” such comparative context is implicit in the essence of the
MFN clause.24 The operation of “like circumstances” is not an
easy task, however, given the elasticity of the terms and, thus,
its ability to cast too wide or too narrow a net, depending on the
level of abstraction or detail.
The application of non-discrimination standards raises difficulties where, as a result of local environmental conditions or
the structure of a specific market, the operator that is treated or
affected differently by the HSE measure is also a foreign investor. A hypothetical example presented by the United States Trade
Representative in the context of the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) clarifies the point:
One concern which was raised was the possibility that
measures entirely consistent with MFN and national
treatment may provide differing treatment to investors
depending on the particular circumstance. For example,
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a foreign investor whose investment is situated on a
wetland may legitimately be treated differently than
another foreign or domestic investor due to the location of the investment, rather than the nationality of the
investor. To address this issue, we included language in
our proposal that would clarify the MAI’s definition of
“in like circumstances,” in order to ensure that legitimate environmental measures will not be challenged
purely on the grounds of such differential treatment.25
The application of the non-discrimination standards to HSE
measures raise at least two intertwined questions concerning the
operation of the phrase “in like circumstances.” First, whether
like circumstances operates as an exception to non-discrimination disciplines or alternatively as an operative element of the
MFN and NT standards. Second, whether like circumstances
refer only to operators in the same economic sector or whether
it includes other differentiating criteria. In addition to these two
questions, it remains open to question whether like circumstances could otherwise safeguard HSE measures that by design
differentiate between investors on the basis of nationality.

Like Circumstances: An Operative Element or an
Exception?
Investment jurisprudence is divided as to whether “like
circumstances” constitutes an operative element of the non-discrimination standards or an exception that could justify differential treatment on policy grounds. Analysis of the Cross-Border
Trucking case, concerning U.S. restrictions on cross-border
trucking services as well as restrictions on Mexican investment
in the U.S. trucking industry, is useful in approaching this issThe
NT and MFN issues before the Cross-Border Trucking NAFTA
Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel turned on the meaning and scope of
the phrase “in like circumstances.”26 The Arbitral Panel sought
guidance from other agreements that use similar language, such
as the Canada-U.S. FTA. As the Panel noted, this agreement contains an exception to NT in services trade,27 where “the difference in treatment is no greater than that necessary for prudential,
fiduciary, health and safety, or consumer protection reasons,” and
explicitly imposes the burden of satisfying the exception on the
party according different treatment.28 The Panel then observed
that the phrase “like circumstances” may properly include differential treatment, under the conditions specified in the CanadaU.S. FTA.29
Upon this reading of “like circumstances” and under the
light of NAFTA’s trade liberalization objectives,30 the Panel
reached the conclusion that the “in like circumstances” language
constitutes an exception to the non-discrimination disciplines
and should thus be interpreted narrowly.31 The Panel explained
that “differential treatment should be no greater than necessary
for legitimate regulatory reasons such as safety, and that such
different treatment be equivalent to the treatment accorded to
domestic service providers.”32
The Cross-Border Trucking Panel’s analysis highlights the
difficulties involved in the operation of non-discrimination disciplines. In particular, the Panel’s reading of “like circumstances”
Spring 2011

as an exception to differential treatment could serve to avoid
unreasonable results, considering that NAFTA’s investment
chapter does not explicitly contain prudential exceptions for
the protection of health, safety, and the environment that could
justify departure from its substantive obligations, unlike trade in
goods and services.33
Other NAFTA arbitral tribunals have confronted similar
issues and adopted a similar rationale in the context of national
treatment. The S.D. Myers Tribunal, for example, noted that the
“assessment of like circumstances must also take into account
circumstances that would justify governmental regulation that
treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.”34
In a similar jurisprudential vein, the Parkering Tribunal
considered environmental criteria in its application of the nondiscrimination standards.35 This case involved parking works
and operations within the old city of Vilnius, Lithuania, which
was protected by the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.36 The investor claimed that other parking works and operations had been
treated differently.37 The Parkering Tribunal applied a binary
construct to the non-discrimination standard: it compared certain economic operators, on the one hand, and it examined the
policy underlying the differential treatment, on the other.38 In
this reading, the non-discrimination standard implicitly incorporates an exception for measures justified by legitimate governmental policies.
It would appear at first sight that this formula could avoid
excessive outcomes by taking into account HSE considerations
to justify differential treatment. However, the practical effect of
such reading reduces the policy space available to governments,
as the meaning of “like circumstances” is narrowed down by the
IIA’s economic objectives. Such a narrow reading of the object
and purpose of IIAs risks frustrating mutually supportive trade
and environment regimes, as the legitimacy of public policy
goals is solely or predominantly evaluated through the lens of the
investment liberalization goals. Moreover, by defining the purpose of investment agreements as tools for protecting investors,
all doubts and ambiguities are resolved in the investors’ favor. To
overcome this apparent lack of balance, IIAs should be appreciated as instruments for sustainable development—embracing its
three pillars: economic, social, and environment—and properly
placed in the broader international law universe.
The reading of “like circumstances” as an exception also
suffers from deficiencies relating to scope and the burden of
proof. In regards to the burden of proof, the interpretation that
treats “like circumstances” as an exception requires the respondent government to justify its regulations, relieving the applicant
of establishing relevant, material facts and proving all the elements of its claim.39 Then in regards to scope, the “exceptional”
formulation of “in like circumstances” hinges on “necessity”
considerations, where arbitral tribunals run the risk of secondguessing government regulators by testing potentially available
least trade restrictive measures against investment liberalizing
objectives. The deficiencies of such “exceptional” readings are
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amplified by the complexity and dynamism of market structures,
as well as by evolving scientific knowledge and changing social
preferences in the modern regulatory State.
Instead, in the investment context, “like circumstances”
should be read in light of its role as the key operative element
of the non-discrimination standards, rather than as a defense,
exception, or justification against MFN or NT obligations. In
such role, “like circumstances” does not involve presumptions,
narrow interpretations, or transfers in the burden of proof. Similarly, such reading does not transpose the WTO necessity test
into the operation of investment non-discrimination disciplines.
As an operative element of the standard, the “like circumstances” test requires the identification of all relevant circumstances that serve to distinguish among foreign investors,
including HSE considerations. In that context, as clarified by
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), analysis of conditions of competition in specific economic sectors provide a point of departure, but neither exhaust
the task of establishing the category of actors that should be compared, nor the policy objectives that can be taken into account to
define relevant parameters for comparison.40 It appears that the
objective relevance of the circumstances for each specific case
seems to be the correct standard of reference,41 including circumstances pertaining to HSE risks. Particular circumstances
with respect to HSE issues should constitute a valid basis for distinguishing among otherwise similar investments or investors.42
Reading “like circumstances” as an operative element of
the NT and MFN standards would do greater justice to the text
and context of IIAs and would have positive systemic effects.
This reading would not presume discrimination in the face of
differential treatment or effects. Furthermore, this reading
would also avoid a mechanical transposition of WTO law and
jurisprudence into IIAs, both of which are different treaties with
different parties, history, practice, text and context, structure,
obligations, and remedies, thereby also avoiding the application
of a goods analysis, or a services analysis, to investment
matters. Finally, the scope of like circumstances would not be
narrowed by the sole consideration of trade and investment
objectives, thereby contributing to building mutually supportive
environment and investment regimes.
The GAMI Tribunal confirmed the role of policy considerations in the determination of “likeness,” and not as an “exception” to non-discrimination disciplines:
The Arbitral Tribunal has not been persuaded that
GAM’s circumstances were demonstrably so “like”
those of non-expropriated mill owners that it was
wrong to treat GAM differently. The Government may
have been clumsy in its analysis of the relevant criteria
for the cutoff line between candidates and non-candidates for expropriation. Its understanding of corporate
finance may have been deficient. But ineffectiveness
is not discrimination. The arbitrators are satisfied that
a reason exists for the measure which was not itself
discriminatory. That measure was plausibly connected
with a legitimate goal of policy (ensuring that the sugar
7

industry was in the hands of solvent enterprises) and
was applied neither in a discriminatory manner nor as a
disguised barrier to equal opportunity.43
Following the reasoning of the GAMI Award, differential
treatment based on HSE considerations would not be on the
basis of nationality, but on the basis of legitimate regulatory
objectives. This rationale applies with particular force with
respect to HSE measures of general application. But what about
HSE measures that call for differential treatment on the basis of
the nationality of the investor?
Governmental measures implementing multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) may well have implications
for the NT and MFN standards in IIAs.44 For example, an MEA
allowing performance requirements to transfer environmentally
sound technology might place greater burdens on a foreign as
compared to domestic investors, and environmental controls
arising out of the Clean Development Mechanism established
under the Kyoto Protocol may require countries to discriminate
between different categories of investors on the basis of nationality.45 In these situations, is the phrase “in like circumstances”
broad enough to safeguard nationality-based discrimination
based on an MEA?
Markedly, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal presented a “like circumstances” formulation that purports to go beyond discrimination on the basis of nationality: “[a] formulation focusing on
the like circumstances question, on the other hand, will require
addressing any difference in treatment, demanding that it be
justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to
rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over
foreign owned investments.”46 Further, the Pope & Talbot Tribunal explicitly noted that differences in treatment will presumptively violate the non-discrimination standards, “unless they
have a reasonable nexus to rational government policies that (1)
do not distinguish, on their face or de facto, between foreign
owned and domestic companies, and (2) do not otherwise unduly
undermine the investment liberalizing objectives of NAFTA.”47
According to this reading, “in like circumstances” can safeguard HSE measures expressing rational government policies
but not if HSE measures, by design, distinguish between investors on the basis of nationality. Thus, under this construct, MEAbased requirements would fail the non-discrimination test.
This solution may not contribute to mutual supportiveness
between investment law and international environmental law
because it could frustrate the objectives of MEAs. Three alternative options provide for a solution whereby the MEA-based,
nationality requirement can co-exist with the non-discrimination standards. First, “in like circumstances” could consider
the fact that the HSE measure is based on an MEA. Second, a
conflict of norms analysis could apply to the conflict between
the investment norm and the MEA norm, giving priority to the
MEA obligation on account of the lex specialis principle. Third,
general exceptions for HSE measures, where available, could
safeguard nationality-based distinctions effected by HSE measures pursuant to MEAs. These three options would not frustrate
the objectives of investment law because the nationality-based
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

distinctions would not be arbitrary or a disguise for an impermissible motive. Further, their rational basis and legitimate policy
goals are underscored by the fact that they have been established
by the international community in an international treaty—the
MEA—seeking solutions to global HSE risks.

In Like Circumstances & the Relevant Comparators
Then on the question of the determination of relevant comparators for the operation of the “like circumstances” test, the
Occidental case, involving discrimination claims by an oil producer against the application of Ecuadorean tax law, provides a
platform for analysis.48 The key issue before the tribunal turned
on the meaning of “in like situations.”49 Occidental argued that
“in like situations” did not refer to companies in the same sector of activity, such as oil producers, but to companies that were
engaged in exports, even if encompassing different sectors.50
Occidental further argued that a number of companies involved
in the export of flowers, mining, seafood products, lumber,
bananas, and African palm oil were entitled to receive Value
Added Tax (“VAT”) refunds and continuously enjoyed that benefit.51 Ecuador responded that “in like circumstances” could not
extend to sectors other than oil producers because the whole purpose of the VAT refund policy was to ensure that the conditions
of competition were not changed.52 Ecuador further noted that
with respect to VAT refunds, all oil producers were treated alike,
including the national State oil company, Petroecuador.53
The Occidental Tribunal found in favor of the claimant
on the basis of thin reasoning and doubtful propositions, two
of which will be noted here. First, the Tribunal noted that “the
purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as compared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing
exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is undertaken.”54 Such formulation is problematic, not least because it
neglects the essence of non-discrimination principles in securing
equal access to opportunity, particularly in respect to the conditions of competition.55 Further, the public interest implications
of such an unbalanced reading are readily apparent, including
with respect to HSE measures, as governments will differentiate
among different sectors for entirely legitimate reasons.56
A more balanced approach to non-discrimination has been
elaborated by the OECD, a forum convening the most heavily
regulated States in the world, in the context of the 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.57 In its 1993 interpretation of the NT standard included in
the 1976 Declaration, the OECD observed that:
As regards the expression “in like situations”, the
comparison between foreign-controlled enterprises
established in a Member country and domestic enterprises in that Member country is valid only if it is made
between firms operating in the same sector. . . . More
general considerations, such as the policy objectives
of Member countries, could be taken into account to
define the circumstances in which comparison between
foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permis-

sible inasmuch as those objectives are not contrary to
the principle of National Treatment.58
A second doubtful proposition underlying the Occidental
Tribunal’s extremely broad reading of “in like situations” relates
to the linkages between disparate treatment and protectionism.
The Occidental Tribunal noted that it was “convinced” that
Occidental’s less favorable treatment, i.e., the fact that unlike
flower exporters it was denied VAT refunds, was not the result
of discriminatory intent.59 Without more, this statement equates
disparate impact with discrimination, and this interpretation dramatically compromises a government’s ability to regulate in the
public interest, including by way of differential and incremental policy approaches.60 In this regard, it may be useful to recall
the attempt by the Chair of the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement
on Investment Negotiating Group to put together a package of
proposals to address member States’ concerns on the impact on
regulatory autonomy of the NT and MFN standards:61
The fact that a measure applied by a government has a
different effect on an investment or investor of another
Party would not in itself render the measure inconsistent with national treatment and most favoured nation
treatment. The objective of “in like circumstances” is to
permit the consideration of all relevant circumstances,
including those relating to a foreign investor and its
investments, in deciding to which domestic or third
country investors and investments they should appropriately be compared.62
This approach is more nuanced and recognizes both the
close link between discrimination and equal opportunity. It also
recognizes the fact that a government may treat economic operators differently for entirely legitimate policy reasons.

Conclusion
The operation of the relative non-discrimination standards
can penetrate deeply into the regulatory sphere of the State, since
they require the State to adduce a coherent explanation of the
relevant categories and distinctions underlying the content and
scope of application of an internal measure. Policy rationales
for disparate treatment can involve a number of public interest
regulations, including with respect to the environment, health,
and safety. In this regard, interpreting “in like circumstances”
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards in
IIAs that accounts for all relevant circumstances relating to the
investment, rather than as a narrow exception that transfers to
the State the burden of justifying its policy preferences, contributes to preserving the policy space necessary for the exercise
of governmental authority in respect of health, safety, and the
environment. Thus, the interpretation of “in like circumstances”
as an operative element of the non-discrimination standards
ultimately contributes to building channels of dialogue between
legal regimes relevant to sustainable development.

Endnotes: Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development
on page 35
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